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information—which is forwarded to the dealer
assigned to the area.
And customers may be reaping the benefits.
Economists Florian Zettelmeyer, Fiona Scott Morton,
and Jorge Silva-Risso found that buyers who used
Autobytel saved an average of 1.2 percent compared
to those who purchased a car through conventional
means. The researchers estimate that the savings
are even greater—slightly above 2 percent—if the
customers who opted for the Internet are those that
pay higher prices at conventional dealers (such as
those who are poor bargainers).
The researchers found several reasons for the
lower prices. First, dealers have a contract with
Autobytel that provides incentives to offer lower
prices. Dealers are required to have a salesperson
who only handles Internet requests and is paid
based on sales volume, rather than on the profit
extracted from negotiating with each customer. 
In addition, some customers used Autobytel but
made their purchase at a dealer other than the one
they were referred to—and they also received lower
prices. This suggests that Internet research makes
online consumers more educated about their pur-
chase and, thus, better negotiators. The low cost of
searching on the Internet could also expand buyers’
options and make it easier to explore distant dealer-
ships and more types of cars in search of a better
deal. Or, perhaps a specific price quote from an
Autobytel-associated dealer gives them leverage to
obtain a better price elsewhere.
Alas, the emergence of the Internet has not made
haggling a thing of the past. A recent online buyer
found that instead of being given a direct quote on
a new car, dealerships invited him to come in and
discuss the issue with them. According to JD Power
and Associates, 14 percent of dealers associated
with Autobytel will quote a discounted price by email
or phone only if the customer insists, and 2 percent




now compensating states for
smoking-related costs. How
will this affect the economy?
By David M. Cutler, Jonathan Gruber, Raymond S.
Hartman, Joseph P. Newhouse, and Meredith B. Rosenthal
smoking costs the Massachusetts Medicaid program money.
The more people smoke, argues the Attorney General’s office, the more
the state spends on Medicaid to pay for smoking-related illnesses. To
recoup these costs, the Attorneys General of Massachusetts and 45
other states took the tobacco manufacturers to court. In November
1998, cigarette companies agreed to pay out $104.7 billion in dam-
ages through the year 2025—the largest sum of money paid in any civ-
il litigation in American history. The master settlement agreement
(MSA) requires tobacco manufacturers to pay reparations for states’
Medicaid expenses, totaling up to $9 billion per year. They must also
sponsor several billion dollars’ worth of anti-smoking advertising and
education over the next ten years and must restrict their advertising
in public places such as outdoor arenas and public transit. The cost
will be covered by a 45 cent per pack price increase on cigarettes, which
was put into effect immediately following the settlement.
What are the economic impacts of the settlement for Massachusetts?
The most obvious is an increase in state revenues; the MSA will net
the Commonwealth an estimated $4.2 billion in revenues over the next
quarter-century, roughly 2 percent of total tax receipts. But, while this
will be an important source of funds to cover the state’s smoking-re-
lated expenses, it doesn’t lead to a net gain for society since it simply
represents a transfer of resources from one group (future smokers) to
another (all the citizens of the state). The benefits to society depend
on how much smoking rates decline due to the agreement, and on as-
sumptions about why people start smoking in the first place.
THE SOCIAL PAYOFF OF IMPROVED HEALTH
How big a social benefit we reap is determined, in part, by how the
settlement influences smoking behavior. First, the 45 cent per pack
price increase raised the cost of cigarettes by about 15 percent per pack.
This is likely to reduce tobacco consumption since as the price of cig-
arettes increases, smokers cut back and nonsmokers are less likely to
start smoking. In fact, recent research shows that the 15 percent price
increase should lead to about a 5 percent decline in smoking partici-
pation among adults. Estimates of the impact of the price increase on
youth smoking are somewhat more difficult to quantify and range from
zero to about 6 percent. The anti-smoking advertising campaign
should also cut smoking rates; other experiments with this type of ad-
vertising have yielded a 5 percent or greater reduction in smoking. The
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new restrictions on advertising in public places, however, are unlike-
ly to reduce smoking since there is no constraint on the tobacco in-
dustry’s increasing advertising expenditures in other venues in com-
pensation. With all these effects taken together, and after adjusting for
the overall decrease in smoking rates, the settlement means 11 to 13 per-
cent fewer people in Massachusetts will smoke in 2025 than today. 
The less people smoke, the healthier they will be—but what does
this mean for society? Improved health will translate into lower Med-
icaid spending, savings which directly benefits taxpayers. Without the
MSA, Massachusetts would have spent about $7.2 billion on smok-
ing-related illnesses by 2025; as smoking declines, so will these costs.
In the end, the MSA will save Massachusetts approxi-
mately $65 million in Medicaid spending by 2025. 
But even more important, the extra years of life gained
by not smoking also have a value to society. In Massa-
chusetts, the MSA will reduce the number of adults who
ever smoke by about 45,000 and the number of youth
smokers by anywhere from 2,100 to 13,000, adding an av-
erage of six years of life per person. These reductions in
smoking will save approximately 550,000 life-years. Mea-
suring the economic value of these life-years saved is a
challenge, but economists have developed several tech-
niques to estimate this figure. One is to survey people
about how much they would be willing to pay to reduce
their probability of dying. The other is to measure the in-
crease in pay associated with performing high-risk jobs,
called a compensating wage differential. The relationship
between the increased risk of death and either increased
wages or willingness to pay can then be used to calculate
the value of an additional year of life. Employing these
techniques, we estimate that the 550,000 life-years saved
by the agreement will yield between $43 billion and $87
billion in social benefits through the year 2025—hundreds
of times the savings from reduced Medicaid spending.
This means, for every dollar transferred from cigarette companies
(and future smokers) to the state, the social benefits from reduced
Medicaid spending and improved health will amount to $15.50. These
benefits would be even greater if we had also included the positive ef-
fect of reduced smoking-related illnesses such as chronic bronchitis or
emphysema. Some studies indicate that people are willing to pay about
$100 to avoid a single day of coughing due to bronchitis, for instance.
It’s hard to measure these effects due to the difficulties of identifying
new cases of disease and of quantifying how much people would be
willing to pay to avoid illness. But if these effects could be included,
the measured benefits of the settlement would substantially increase.
VICE OR VIRTUE?
But how to account for the pleasures of smoking to the smoker? Some
economists argue that smokers must feel that the enjoyment they ex-
perience from smoking is worth its price to their health; otherwise they
wouldn’t smoke in the first place. If this theory of “rational addiction”
is correct, then the social benefits of reduced smoking are completely
offset by the social cost of lost smoking pleasure. This argument is only
convincing, however, if smokers make a rational choice to smoke. But
90 percent of smokers begin to smoke when they are under 18, an age
when they may not be capable of making decisions in an adult capac-
ity and when they are overly optimistic about their ability to quit. Fur-
thermore, studies show that smokers tend to underestimate by about
40 percent the future costs (primarily to their health) that they them-
selves will bear from smoking, making it hard to argue that they are
properly accounting for these costs in their decisions to smoke. And
the addictive quality of nicotine means that an irrational youthful de-
cision to start smoking, for many, becomes permanent. While it is in-
disputable that smokers derive pleasure from smoking, they may ex-
cessively weight short-term pleasure over longer-term costs. Thus, our
estimates show that even if smokers do get some pleasure from smok-
ing, there is still likely to be a substantial social benefit to reduced
smoking—and one much greater than the direct payments of the to-
bacco manufacturers to the Commonwealth’s coffers.
SO GOES THE NATION
While our study only examined the effects of the settlement in Mass-
achusetts, the social gains are likely to be similar in other states. The
improved health of the population due to decreased smoking, which
should be similar across states, accounts for 99 percent of the social
benefits. By comparison, reduced Medicaid payments, which vary
from state to state, account for only 1 percent. As a result, the nation
as a whole can expect to reap 30 to 40 times the benefits found for
Massachusetts—an overall social gain in the trillions of dollars. We
can be sure that smoking will always have social costs, but the tobac-
co settlement will help offset them for at least the next 25 years.S
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